Christopher Burgess | Hurricane Melissa: Unprecedented and underprepared

Hurricane Melissa’s landfall in Westmoreland, marked an unprecedented chapter in Jamaica’s history. With sustained 185-mph winds, it was the third most powerful Atlantic storm — a 700-year return event. Melissa unleashed forces beyond what engineers design to withstand.

Melissa meandered south of the island for four days — giving Jamaica time to prepare, but also eroding nerves. When it finally struck as a Cat5, the eye tore through New Hope in Westmoreland, Maroon Town in St. James, and exited at Duncans in Trelawny, as a Cat4. It tested Jamaica’s experience, and preparedness systems. It revealed that disasters demand competent professional leadership, and a more equitable response. Preparation must go beyond press briefings.

TWO HURRICANES, SAME LESSONS

Hurricanes Gilbert (1988) and Melissa showed that decades of disaster management progress are missing. Gilbert devastated the entire island leaving about 100 dead and half a million homeless, with 135 mph winds. Melissa’s stronger winds hit the western parishes, killing about 45 people and damaging about 135,000 homes, fewer than Gilbert’s 239,000, based on UN aerial surveys.

Economically, both hurricanes caused similar damage. PAHO estimated Gilbert’s losses at about US$12 billion in today’s value, while Melissa’s approach US$10-12 billion. The real difference is poverty: when Gilbert struck in 1988, over 30 per cent of Jamaicans lived in poverty; today the rate is below 8 per cent. A wealthier Jamaica should be more ready to recover.

Despite major advances in hurricane forecasting, public awareness and preparedness did not improve. ODPEM’s readiness — in shelters and supplies — trailed the goodwill of citizens and contractors. In 1988, warnings for Gilbert came late, giving Jamaicans less than three hours of daylight to prepare on September 11, according to Jeremy Collymore of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency.

By contrast, Melissa arrived in an era of satellites, with warnings issued three days in advance. Yet the response ignored storm-surge studies sitting in ODPEM office for Black River, which showed Market Street would flood by at least five feet. Publicly funded research must be used to guide evacuation and protect lives and property. These facts demand enquiry.

EROSION AT ODPEM?

Melissa met an expanded disaster management framework in ODPEM, tested through Hurricanes Ivan (2004), Dennis (2008), and Beryl (2024). Yet, the response fell short. Absenteeism of key agencies from Disaster Council might have weakened coordination when it was most needed. Thankfully, JDF and contractors led road clearance in Black River and Holland Bamboo. Response demands experienced professional leadership.

There are concerns about weakened technical leadership and political interference at ODPEM. Between 2017 and 2020, an exodus of professionals exposed low pay, even at the top. In 2021, Director General Leslie Harrow resigned after just six months, citing disrespect and interference. Low wages drive away the very expertise disaster management needs. The recent appointment of Commander Alvin Gayle risks deepening that instability. Yet, when natural disasters have wiped out up to 75 per cent of GDP, like Gilbert—far more than COVID-19 or oil shocks, Jamaica can no longer afford to underpay technical competence. Managing national crises requires professionals, not placeholders.

PREPARATION PAUSE

Jamaica had enough time to prepare for Hurricane Melissa, but failed to use it wisely. Schools and offices closed five days before landfall, yet adequate supplies weren’t pre-positioned near the impact zone. School buses sat idle while residents in Catherine Hall and Black River remained in danger. By Monday, forecasts clearly showed a Category 5 strike on the west, but the National Disaster Risk Management Council did not pivot resources effectively there, from Clarendon and Manchester. When the storm hit, response faltered—it took four days, until November 1, for JDF convoy of food to reach Black River, a day after Shaggy’s team delivered food. Experienced leadership would have food and water there in 72 hours which is the UN standard for disaster response.

Yet 90 miles north, Cuba was prepared for Melissa. United Nations noted authorities evacuated 735,000 people, and pre-positioned relief stocks. Tourists described how organised it was. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin’s evacuation order before Hurricane Katrina in 2005 saved hundreds of thousands of lives, as 90 per cent of residents evacuated. Preparedness and evacuation discipline saved lives and was missing in our preparation and response.

DYSTOPIA IN THE WEST

While Black River drew national attention, a deeper despair has unfolded across western Jamaica in the two weeks since Melissa struck. Flattened board homes, that echo a post-colonial past, and torn roofs left the most vulnerable exposed in communities like Darliston. New housing developments were submerged, and some roofs were stripped in St. James. Purchasers looked on in disbelief. Housing damage estimates in St Elizabeth, Westmoreland, and St James range from 50 to 65 per cent. By day three, hunger drove residents to loot stores, prompting Mayor Vernon of St James and the JCF to warn about spoiled food entering the supply chain. Farmers walked through ruined fields and where poultry sheds once stood, counting their losses.

The absence of drinking water turned survival into desperation. Residents fetched water from rivers and roadside streams; I saw this firsthand in St. James, beside Bogue Wastewater Treatment Plant, Anchovy and Rhyne Park where several cars filled jugs, and a vendor filled containers on a flatbed trailer. Flooded homes in Catherine Hall and West Green buried under mud after record rainfall overwhelmed aged flood protection. The west is a scene of thirst, exhaustion, and price gouging, with response systems lagging. The PSOJ later urged the prime minister to speed up recovery efforts. But is the response adequate?

Melissa was not beyond Jamaica’s capacity to prepare—it was beyond the current technical leadership capacity to organise and coordinate quickly and respond equitably. Three decades after Hurricane Gilbert, Melissa proved that while technology has advanced, our preparedness and coordination have not — even with days of advance warning. True readiness demands more than press briefings — it requires experienced technical leadership.

Christopher Burgess, PhD, is a civil engineer, land developer, climate change scientist and the Managing Director of CEAC Solutions. Send feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com