Nand C. Bardouille | CARICOM’s inflection point

On January 30, along with a team that included Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretary General Carla Barnett, Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis Terrance Drew paid an official visit to Trinidad and Tobago. Drew met with the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in his capacity as the current Chair of CARICOM.

An official statement, issued by Drew’s Office ahead of this visit, indicated (in part): “During the visit, Dr. Drew is expected to meet with the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Hon. Kamla Persad-Bissessar, along with members of her Cabinet and senior officials, to discuss matters of regional importance.”

While a specific set of outcomes of this meeting is not yet clear, as of this writing, it is regarded as perhaps the most consequential one in respect of “the Chair’s focus on face-to-face discussions with regional leaders.” This ongoing engagement has its origins in Drew’s clarion call for “managing our dialogue with care, mutual respect, and a resolute sense of regional responsibility.”

STRAINED RELATIONS

The backdrop is strained relations between Trinidad and Tobago and virtually all of the bloc’s other 13 sovereign member states, which are wary of what they regard as Port of Spain’s new foreign policy. It marks a sharp break from the decades-old international relations ethos of CARICOM, which prioritizes foreign policy positioning along the lines of a more cooperative, rules-based international order.

Much focus in Trinidad and Tobago’s prevailing foreign policy goes to the spheres of influence-related geopolitical aims of the United States, as seen in the lead-up to and since US forces’ ouster of now former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. (For detailed analysis that tracks this foreign policy trajectory, refer to my article for the Trinidad and Tobago Guardian dated January 8.)

To be sure, Port of Spain’s associated reordering of its priorities and rhetoric relative to CARICOM also carries significant implications for the bloc’s unity.

It is instructive that the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, CARICOM’s constituent treaty, enjoins signatories to “establish measures to co-ordinate the foreign policies of the Member States of the Community.” And yet in the case of US interventionism relative to Venezuela, as one commentator notes, “the Trinidad and Tobago Government stands as the only CARICOM member to break ranks with its regional partners in supporting the militarisation of the Caribbean Sea.”

Another commentator underlines that “[a]ligning itself with Washington and dismissing regional diplomacy has left [Trinidad and Tobago] isolated amid the Venezuela crisis.”

In such circumstances, as evidenced by the normative and praxis-based moorings of its diplomatic playbook, CARICOM’s core interests are on the line. There has also been increasing concern that the regional grouping’s ability to collectively act to protect shared interests is under strain, stemming from the discord in question and extra-regional international developments. In this latter regard, Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency looms large over CARICOM’s foreign policy landscape.

OPPOSING LOGICS OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTION

One year of Donald Trump’s second term has revealed the “predatory mode” of American hegemony all the while. When the world’s pre-eminent superpower acts “with impunity and believes its power matters more than international law,” CARICOM member states lose.

Why is this the case? Under these conditions, the “Donroe Doctrine” compounds a geopolitical moment that unashamedly embraces a might is right foreign policy ethos.

The geopolitical context surrounding CARICOM member states has prompted bifurcated reactions within their ranks, resulting in two camps that adhere to two opposing logics of foreign policy action.

Trinidad and Tobago fits squarely into the camp that shows deference to the United States’ foreign policy way qua interventionism. Barbados is the foreign policy torchbearer of the other camp, which holds fast to the bloc’s foreign policy traditions.

It remains to be seen whether these two camps can collectively lay forth a uniform, clear-sighted assessment of the prevailing geopolitical moment. For their part, CARICOM insiders assess that this moment risks foreclosing any possibility of these small states’ recourse to “the [multilateral] architecture of collective problem solving.” (Besides, the stark reality is that the United Nations (UN) is on its knees, facing — according to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres — “imminent financial collapse”.)

In fact, differences in tone and approach have come to characterize how those two camps are dealing with the Trump 2.0-related foreign policy context.

BREACH WITHIN CARICOM

One of the clearest consequences of this state of affairs is the associated breach within CARICOM, which is the subject of my two-part article for the Trinidad and Tobago Guardian — published on December 26 & 27, 2025. This development is the first of two factors that lie at the core of Drew’s desire to engage his fellow CARICOM leaders via in-person outreach at this time. The second factor is that this state of play in the said foreign policy split spells trouble for CARICOM, having weakened it across the board.

Drew reckons that the kind of outreach he helms – which got underway in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in recent days and receives the support of the Guyana-based CARICOM Secretariat (the bloc’s principal administrative organ) – is responsive to the urgency of the situation.

Foremost in his thinking is the responsibility that falls to him to lay the groundwork for the all-important Fiftieth Regular Meeting of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government. The summit, carded for February 24-27 in St. Kitts and Nevis, will take place under his chairmanship.

The serious rift among CARICOM member states, as previously indicated, adds urgency to this summit. As I contend in an article for the Jamaica Gleaner, published on January 14, CARICOM’s leadership has likely already come to the realization that this high-level meeting is a test that the bloc cannot afford to fail. This likely means that at this summit, given that the stakes are high, CARICOM faces a unity-defining moment.

COURSE CORRECTION

Accordingly, Drew’s region-level outreach is laudable. It is a reflection of out of the box thinking, when the task before him is hard. It allows him to kick into high gear CARICOM’s efforts at course correction and, in doing so, to read the room.

But even so, for now at least, CARICOM may not get the result it wants.

As I argue in another article for the Jamaica Gleaner, published on January 19, the Trump administration’s roll-out of the “Donroe Doctrine” – whose logic of intervention is strong – suggests that CARICOM member states’ sovereignty-related gains face their toughest test yet from a US administration. Importantly, these circumstances are having a knock-on effect on regional unity.

For the CARICOM bloc, facing international politics’ re-emergent spheres of influence character and dual thinking from within its ranks on this system-impacting development, there is the rub.

In a context where the bloc’s respective member states significantly depend on the United States, the reality is that Washington’s intent is to focus ostensibly on bilateral imperatives qua ties. This is precisely the dynamic that – apart from the rupture in the region regarding so-called “external geopolitical developments” – makes moving the needle on shaping regional consensus on US policy toward respective CARICOM member states that much harder.

More broadly, CARICOM member states are overwhelmed by US interests. Faced with renewed US dominance and power projection in the Western Hemisphere, geared toward zero-sum outcomes, these countries are scrambling to respond – increasingly narrowly and pragmatically focused on the national interest.

Equally significant is that, given the ubiquity of Trump’s foreign policy cudgel vis-à-vis CARICOM member states’ international relations, the long-standing assumptions of regional politics – as well as the unity-driven strategies built on them – may no longer hold.

Still, strengthening CARICOM unity is a pressing issue for the bloc’s member states. At surface level, as regards seeing the way forward, the recently concluded meeting between Drew and Persad-Bissessar looks promising in moving things along. There are signs of a growing rapprochement between the two sides.

Following this meeting, Persad-Bissessar described the discussions she had with Drew as “productive”. Persad-Bissessar also aligned her government with Drew’s previously stated view that “our collective strength is greater than any single issue before us.”

She delivered a carefully choreographed message regarding CARICOM unity, as follows: “While Trinidad and Tobago believes that CARICOM is in urgent need of transformation, we remain steadfast in our commitment to Caribbean unity.”

Persad-Bissessar appears to be softening her tone on CARICOM, having previously said the bloc is “not a reliable partner at this time”. In a further sign of the thawing of relations between Trinidad and Tobago and CARICOM, Persad-Bissessar went out of her way to make Drew and his delegation feel welcome.

Should Trinidad and Tobago not take its seat at CARICOM’s summit this month, or, if its representation is downgraded, Trinidad and Tobago-CARICOM relations (at an all-time low of late) would face another setback. It is noteworthy that Persad-Bissessar skipped the previous summit, which was held just a few weeks after the start of her second term as the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. It is unclear whether Persad-Bissessar will attend the upcoming summit; nor has Trinidad and Tobago’s delegation been announced.

From Drew’s perspective, his meeting with Persad-Bissessar was “very constructive”. He made a point of framing the meeting in the context of regional preparations for CARICOM’s summit this month, contending further that his outreach to and engagement with colleague heads “are about listening, aligning, and moving our Caribbean Community forward!”

Both leaders struck a tone of cordiality. The atmospherics suggest that a breakthrough of sorts may be in the works. One thing is certain: At the highest levels of CARICOM, there are strong indications that efforts will continue apace to ease foreign policy-related regional tensions and pursue joint gains.

That said, the bloc’s Chairman has his work cut out to pilot this process, as – fundamentally – the regional grouping stands at an inflection point. Its context is the harsh reality of contemporary international politics that will likely outlast Trump 2.0. This also includes divergent thinking qua interpretations about how to grapple with predation as the driving force behind international relations, and increasingly so.

A RUBICON FOR CARICOM

Not for the first time, unilateral power is weighing on CARICOM member states. As CARICOM’s history shows, in such circumstances, sovereignty, coordination and internal coherence are tested.

At this geopolitical juncture, though, the two camps under reference are split over whether or not to take the foreign policy route of accommodation in the quest for security relative to the United States.

A legal luminary, who I had an exchange of views with recently on this matter, conveyed the following: “External pressure is rarely decisive on its own – it becomes effective when regional actors are divided about how to respond to it. That tension between unity and accommodation is where the real vulnerability lies.”

In this regard, and to quote from the aforementioned correspondence once more, it is important to bear in mind that “[o]nce member states begin to fracture along unilateral calculations of short-term advantage, the region forfeits the very shield that international law and unity provide to small jurisdictions.”

This is not a Rubicon that any CARICOM member state ought to cross under the weight of US foreign policy, all things considered.

Any attempt to normalize an approach to international relations that is skewed to hard power undermines small states’ long-term interests, considering their reliance on the rules-based international order – rather than force – for their survival. Moreover, it signals a willingness to constrain and diminish CARICOM’s multilateralism-related room for manoeuvre.

Now CARICOM needs to demonstrate it can muster a collective response to a geopolitical trend line that threatens its member states’ post-independence gains on the international stage.

On the occasion of its upcoming summit, then, the regional grouping would do well to issue a call to action on foreign policy that might allow it to deal with the hard power turn in international politics as best it can.

- Nand C. Bardouille, Ph.D., is the manager of The Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean in the Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies (The UWI) St. Augustine Campus, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The views expressed here are his own. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com