Editorial | NaRRA and Malahoo Forte

 

Early Wednesday, after a long late-night sitting of the House, the Government used its majority to push through still flawed legislation for the QUANGO (Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation), which will be responsible for the spending of hundreds of billions of dollars with little, or at best, a thin system of accountability.

 

If those who have raised concerns about weaknesses in the NaRRA law, including its overconcentration of power in the hands of its CEO and the prime minister, or the PM’s designated minister, are convinced about the seriousness and validity of their arguments, they will have to be creative and remain tenacious in pursuing their agenda. The vote in the House and Friday's endorsement of the bill by the Senate can’t be the end of their engagement.

 

First, though, the triumph of Ms Malahoo Forte, who has served as attorney general and was the legal and constitutional affairs minister in Prime Minister Andrew Holness’ previous Cabinet (2020-2024). Unburdened by ministerial office, and now the government’s backbench, she rediscovered her voice and displayed moral clarity in the cause of good governance and accountable government. 

 

Her evisceration 12 days ago of several aspects of the bill; her declaration that critics, including the Opposition, had raised “valid concerns”; and her conclusion that legislation needed “some reworking”, were likely to have factored significantly in the concessions offered by the Government.  

 

NOT THE END

 

That, however, was not the end. In the Tuesday-Wednesday sitting of Parliament, while her governing Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) colleagues, as is common in the legislature, dutifully lined up with the Government, Ms Malahoo Forte remained sceptical about key aspects of NaRRA’s structure, including the absence of a governing board. To the irritation of several JLP members, including the Speaker, Juliet Holness, she raised questions about, and proposed changes to, elements of the bill as the House, sitting in committee, went through the legislation clause by clause. She voted with the Opposition against some clauses.

 

This is rare in Jamaica for legislators, on either side, especially in votes on signature bills. Parliament, and Jamaica’s democracy, are better for Ms Malahoo Forte’s stance.

 

A special-purpose vehicle to lead the rebuilding of Jamaica, after Hurricane Melissa’s devastation of the western third of the island in October is a good idea. The Category 5 storm destroyed or severely damaged tens of thousands of homes as well as public and private infrastructure. The cost of the physical destruction was estimated at US$8.8 billion, nearly 42 per cent of GDP.

 

BEYOND CAPACITY

 

Reconstruction of the scale required, including relocating entire communities, is beyond the capacity of the existing state bureaucracy, hollowed by decades of ‘reform’. Neither can it be accomplished within the Government’s normal budget framework and cycles.

 

A nimble institution to lead the process makes sense. However, speed and urgency can’t be at the expense of clear oversight and accountability.

 

In that regard, the absence of a formal board of governance for NaRRA remains unacceptable for a body that over the next five years or so - depending on when the Government invokes the legislation’s sunset clause - could have control between US$5-US$10 billion. With pledges from multilateral financial agencies and the Government’s own funds from parametric insurance and bonds, Jamaica already has US$7.6 billion in reconstruction financing.

 

In the circumstances, the Jamaica Resilience and Oversight Committee (JAMRROC) - which will be an advisory rather than a governance body - is insufficient for a body whose CEO will effectively be “the Authority”, reporting to the prime minister, or the minister, who the prime minister assigns the task.   Indeed, it is the prime minister who will appoint NaRRA’s chief executive officer, raising legitimate concerns about a concentration of power in the hands of the executive.

 

Those fears are exacerbated in a context where NaRRA will not only award massive contracts, but the minister will have the power to override existing regulatory regimes to advance NaRRA’s projects.

 

The concessions requiring NaRRA to hold consultations with impacted communities is welcome as is the requirement for the CEO to provide semi-annual reports to the minister for tabling in Parliament. The Gleaner though, holds to its recommendation that the CEO should be made to appear before a designated NaRRA parliamentary committee.

 

Much has been made about the similarity in design between NaRRA and New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) after earthquakes in 2020 and 2011. New Zealand doesn’t share, in the same measure, Jamaica’s governance deficits. In any event, it is good to learn from the problems and best practices of others.

 

In a 2017 review of CERA, New Zealand’s then auditor general, Lyn Provost, observed: “Forming a view on the effectiveness of CERA has been difficult. CERA’s external performance measures were focused on what it was going to do rather than on what it was trying to achieve. This means that it was not able to provide a good account of its effectiveness or demonstrate its value for money.”

 

Real time, robust oversight, and accountability matter.