Editorial | Learn from Hong Kong fire

This newspaper is grateful that there hasn’t been a serious fire at any of Jamaica’s growing number of high-rise buildings, so as to test the integrity of their construction, or the capacity of the island’s firefighters to adequately respond to such a catastrophe. And we hope it never happens.

However, last week’s blaze at the Wang Fuk Court towers in Hong Kong, where at least 128 people died and over 200 remain unaccounted for, is understandably again raising questions about the safety of Jamaica’s high-rises. The authorities – especially those who regulate construction, and/or have responsibility for hazard prevention and mitigation – have an obligation to respond.

It is not sufficient for them to say (which is not to suggest that this is their posture) that they have in the past given those assurances, that the oversight mechanisms remain robust and safe, and that Jamaica’s firefighting professionals are as skilled as any.

The Gleaner makes no claim to the contrary.

However, several factors underline the value of addressing this matter seriously, not least being the wisdom, in the current environment, of assuaging the anxieties of Jamaicans. And not with slick fob-offs or spurious arguments. There must be reasoned and frank discussion, based on good science and credible data.

The uneasiness, at this time, is indeed real. Although not a fire, the severe destruction Hurricane Melissa caused in western Jamaica a month ago has raised people’s awareness, and fear, of catastrophes of all types. Indeed, some of the buildings damaged by Hurricane Melissa’s 185mph winds were among Jamaica’s tallest and sturdiest.

The hurricane, however, had little impact on the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), the home of the largest concentration of high-rise structures. People, in the circumstances, wonder how these buildings, many with large arrays of glass sidings and windows, might have fared if faced with the concentrated fury of the category 5 storm.

The focus, though, is on high-rises and fire, how, and with what, these buildings were constructed, and the integrity of regulatory oversight to which they were subjected.

With respect to the latter, it is common, across jurisdictions, for citizens to be told that regulations were enforced, only for the contrary to be proved. Like with the 2017 fire at the 24-storey Grenfell Tower in London, in which 72 people died.

An inquiry into the fire, whose final report was issued in 2024, concluded that an aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding, installed when the building was refurbished in 2016, was the primary cause for the rapid spread of the fire. The cladding wasn’t in compliance with building regulations. Indeed, the dangers of ACM was known for a quarter of a century before the Grenfell fire, but the authorities were slow to act and builders fudged on the matter.

The inquiry also revealed weaknesses and failures in the building’s safety regime as well as serious technical difficulties faced by firefighters in battling the flames. These included something common among firefighters when confronted with fires at super tall buildings: the ladders of their tenders can’t make it to the highest reaches of the structures and the pressure of their water pumps are often inadequate.

Since Grenfell, several fires in the Gulf region, and now in Hong Kong, have underlined the difficulty, and dangers, of managing such blazes. Aside from the technical issues, regulatory weaknesses, insufficient attention to materials used in construction and the failure of the people in-charge to listen to residents, contribute to the problem.

Grenfell residents complained about the cladding (the same type that was involved in the 2017 Torch Tower fire in Dubai) at the time of its installation. They were concerned, too, about blocked fire exits, a lack of sprinklers, fire alarms that didn’t work, and the building’s faulty electricity.

In Hong Kong, residents at Wang Fuk Court had complained about netting that covered bamboo scaffolding being used during the renovation of the complex’s eight towers. Rightly, they feared it was flammable.

When nothing obvious happened, some residents attempted to raise awareness of the possible dangers among residents. The covering of the Wang Fuk windows with flammable material to protect panes from breaking during the refurbishing was another concern.

Further, the firefighters at Wang Fuk faced the common technical issues, including the inadequacy of their aerial ladders and insufficient water pressure to reach the highest floors.

Jamaica’s building code calls for sprinklers in high-rise buildings. That is good. Sprinklers, however, are likely to be insufficient in a major fire. Fire professionals are indispensable.

But as Carlos Pipher, a Jamaican safety professional, pointed out in a 2022 article in this newspaper, even well-equipped fire services have difficulty with external reach beyond 75 feet – perhaps seven floors. They usually then have to fight the fire from inside the building.

Mr Pipher wrote at the time: “Fire poses the greatest risk to a high-rise structure and thus increases the probability of loss of lives because of the inability to evacuate quickly due to the large size of the structure, the large volume of occupants, and the difficulty to respond to and extinguish a fire that is out of the reach of firefighting equipment.

“Therefore, it is of utmost importance that security/property managers are well versed in safety and security issues that are applicable to a high-rise structure.”

It also helps if people build to code and the regulatory rules are followed. The rapid changing of Jamaica’s skyline insists this does indeed happen and that regulators are transparent and accountable.